Game Theory: Rationality and Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction (1993, NS 88) Partha Dasgupta, Karl-Göran Mäler, Jörgen Weibull and others June 18-20, Björkborn Manor, Karlskoga Proceedings: E Kalai: Special issue of the journal Games and Economics Behavior, vol. 8, no. 1, January 1995, Academic Press, Inc., USA ISSN 0899-8256

 

Table of Contents
Editor's Note Ehud Kalai	1
INTRODUCTION
Nobel Symposium on Game Theory: Rationality and Equilibrium in Strategic Interaction Brian Skyrms	3
SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality Robert J. Aumann	6
Learning in Extensive-Form Games. I. Self-Confirming Equilibria Drew Fudenberg and David M. Kreps	20
Learning To Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game John Gale, Kenneth G. Binmore, and Larry Samuelson	56
A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Complete Information John C. Harsanyi	91
Subjective Games and Equilibria Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer	123
Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term Alvin E. Roth and Ido Erev	164
An Axiomatic Theory of a Risk Dominance Measure for Bipolar Games with Linear Incentives Reinhard Selten	213
REVIEWS AND COMMENTS
The 50th Anniversary of TGEB Willaim F. Lucas	264
ANNOUNCEMENT	269