|
1969 2012
Prize category:
|
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1994
John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr., Reinhard Selten
The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1994
Nobel Prize Award Ceremony
John C. Harsanyi
John F. Nash Jr.
Reinhard Selten
Reinhard Selten
Born: 5 October 1930, Breslau (now Wroclaw), Germany (now Poland)
Affiliation at the time of the award: Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany
Prize motivation: "for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games"
Field: Game theory
Contribution: Refined the Nash equilibrium concept for analyzing dynamic strategic interaction by getting rid of unlikely equilibria. He also applied the refined concept to analyses of oligopolistic competition.

Autobiography
I was born in Breslau on October 5th,
1930. At that time, Breslau, now called Wroclaw, belonged to
Germany and only German was spoken there. After the second world
war Breslau became Polish and the original German population was
almost completely replaced by a Polish one. I have never visited
Wroclaw after the war. Heavy fighting destroyed most of the town
in which I grew up and most of the familiar places of my youth
look different now.
When I was born my father owned a business called a "reading
circle"; folders containing an assortment of magazines were lent
to customers for one week, then recollected and lent out again.
The older the folder, the lower was the fee. This was a
florishing branch of industry. My father had built up his
business in spite of the fact that he became blind at young years
and had only three years of school education. Already in the
mid-thirties he had to sell his firm because of his Jewish
origin. Jews were forbidden to run a business connected to the
press. My father did not belong to any religous community and my
mother was a protestant. Originally my parents intended to let me
grow up without any attachment to a particular religion in order
to give me the opportunity to decide for myself later in my life.
However, under the prevailing political circumstances it seemed
to be better to have me baptized as a protestant. The ceremony is
one of my early memories. Much later as a young man I left the
protestant church and became unattached to any religion again.
Unlike several other relatives my father did not become a victim
of the holocaust, since he died after a serious illness already
in 1942 before the worst of the terror began.
It was not easy for me to live as a half-Jewish boy under the
Hitler regime. When I was 14 I had to leave high school and the
opportunity to learn a trade was denied to me. The only career
open to me was that of an unskilled worker. Fortunately it turned
out that this did not matter much since after about half a year
my mother, my brothers, my sister, and I left Breslau on one of
the last trains before all outbound railway traffic
stopped.
My situation as a member of an officially despised minority
forced me to pay close attention to political matters very early
in my life. Moreover I found myself in opposition to the
political views shared by the vast majority of the population. I
had to learn to trust my own judgment rather than
official propaganda or public opinion. This was a strong
influence on my intellectual development. My continuing interest
in politics and public affairs was one of the reasons why I began
to be interested in economics in my last high school years.
After we left Breslau we were refugees, first in Saxonia, then in
Austria and finally in Hessia. Until schools opened again in 1946
I worked as a farm boy, first in Austria and later in the village
in Hessia where we lived. In 1947, we moved to Melsungen, a small
town in which I went to high school until 1951. In these years I
developed a strong interest in mathematics. When we still lived
in the village near Melsungen, I had to walk to school which took
about three and a half hours there and back. During these walks I
occupied my mind with problems of elementary geometry and
algebra. I still like to hike in forested hills and to think
while walking.
When I finished high school, it was clear to me that I would
study mathematics, even if I also considered economics and
psychology. It took me relatively long to reach my master's
degree in mathematics. My studies were not sufficiently
concentrated on this goal. One of the reasons was that I went to
many lectures which had nothing to do with my study of
mathematics. However, it later turned out that some of these
extracurricular activities became important for my career. I
studied mathematics at the university of Frankfurt from 1951 to
1957. Until I completed my "Vordiplom", the intermediate
examination which roughly corresponds to the bachelor's degree, I
also had to study physics. Originally I considered to take
astronomy as a minor for my master's degree and I actually spent
much time trying to get some knowledge of this field but now
almost everything is forgotten. What finally turned me away from
astronomy was that I became more and more involved in game theory
and economics. I am grateful to the Natural Science Faculty of
Frankfurt
University for the decision to permit mathematical economics
as a minor for the master's degree in order to enable me to be
the first one to take this choice.
My first contact with game theory was a popular article in
Fortune Magazine which I read in my last high school year. I was
immediately attracted to the subject matter and when I studied
mathematics I found the fundamental book by von Neumann and
Morgenstern in the library and studied it. Somewhat later I saw
the announcement of a student seminar for economists on game
theory, headed by Professor Ewald Burger who taught advanced
mathematical courses but also mathematics for economists. I
participated in the seminar and Ewald Burger gave me the chance
to write a master's thesis in cooperative game theory. He was a
man of extraordinary mathematical erudition and an excellent
teacher. I owe much to his guidance and to his patient
advise.
My master's thesis and later my Ph.D. thesis had the aim of
axiomatizing a value for e-person games in extensive form. This
work made me familiar with the extensive form, in a time when
very little work on extensive games was done. This enabled me to
see the perfectness problem earlier than others and to write the
contributions for which I am now honored by the prize in memory
of Alfred Nobel.
After I had received my master's degree in 1957, I was hired by
Professor Heinz Sauermann, an economist at the University of
Frankfurt am Main, who employed me for ten years in various
assistant positions. It was my task to do research funded by
Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, the German counterpart of the
National Science
Foundation. At first I was supposed to apply decision theory
to the theory of the firm, but soon I became involved in economic
laboratory experimentation. Fortunately the referees of
Sauermann's research proposals approved of this new research
direction. This made it possible to finance a small group of
young people doing experimental research. Sauermann had about 15
assistants and only two to four of them were involved in
experiments. I became something like a foreman of this small
detachment. Reinhard Tietz, Volker Haselbarth, Otwin Becker,
Klaus Schuster and others belonged to it for longer or shorter
periods.
Heinz Sauermann was a remarkable man. He was one of the first to
propagate Keynesianism in Germany. In spite of a lack of
mathematical training he encouraged his students to do work based
on formal models. He always had a good feeling for the trends of
the field and therefore was very successful in suggesting the
right problem areas to those who did research under his
supervision. Moreover he was an excellent administrator and
scientific organizer, who did much for the propagation of
experimental economics. I owe much to him.
In 1959, I married Elisabeth Langreiner, who for all the years
since then helped me to become the person I am now. We would have
liked to have children but we do not have any. We both belong to
the Esperanto movement and this is how we met. The international
language Esperanto has still an important influence on our
life.
My first publication was a journal article with the title "Ein
Oligopolexperiment" (an oligopoly experiment) written together
with Heinz Sauermann and published in 1959. When we began to do
experimental economics at Frankfurt, such a field had not yet
existed. My attempts to learn some psychology while I studied
mathematics had made me acquainted to experimental techniques. I
had listened to lectures of the gestalt psychologist Edwin
Rausch, who was a careful experimenter, and I had participated in
psychological experiments as a subject. Therefore it seemed
natural to me to try an experimental approach to oligopoly.
In 1961, I received my Ph.D. in mathematics at the University of
Frankfurt am Main. Shortly afterwards Oskar Morgenstern made it
possible for me to participate in a game theory conference at
Princeton. In the late 50s - I do not remember the
year - he had given a talk at Frankfurt and my remarks in the
subsequent discussion must have impressed him. In the following
years he sometimes asked me to meet him when his travels brought
him to Frankfurt. He also gave me financial support for staying
several weeks longer at Princeton after the game theory
conference. My short visit to Princeton was important for my life
since it gave me the opportunity to interact with R.J. Aumann and
M. Maschler who were members of Morgenstern's research group at
that time.
Around 1958, I became aware of H.A.
Simon's seminal papers on bounded rationality and was
immediately convinced by his arguments. I tried to construct a
theory of boundedly rational multigoal decision making. Together
with Heinz Sauermann, I worked out an "aspiration adaptation
theory of the firm" which was published as a journal article in
1962. After the Princeton conference in 1961, I visited
Pittsburgh for two days in order to establish contacts with H.A.
Simon and his associates. The problem of bounded rationality has
occupied my mind for a long time but unfortunately with less
success than I had hoped for. More and more I came to the
conclusion that purely speculative approaches like that of our
paper of 1962 are of limited value. The structure of boundedly
rational economic behavior cannot be invented in the armchair, it
must be explored experimentally.
In the early 60's I had run experiments on an oligopoly game with
demand inertia. A game theoretical analysis of this model proved
to be too difficult but I was able to solve a simplified version.
I found a natural equilibrium but the game has many other
equilibria. In order to describe the distinguishing features of
my solution, I defined subgame perfectness. My paper, Ein
Oligopolmodell mit Nachfrageträgheit (An Oligopoly Model with
Demand Inertia) was published in 1965. At that time I did not
suspect that it often would be quoted, almost exlusively for the
definition of subgame perfectness. Very soon it became clear to
me that the perfectness problem is not completely solved by this
concept. Therefore in a paper published in 1975, I defined a
refined notion of perfectness, now often referred to as trembling
hand perfectness.
In 1965, I was invited to a game theory workshop at Jerusalem
which lasted for three weeks and had only 17 participants, but
among them all the important researchers in game theory, with few
exceptions. Game theory was still a small field. We had heated
discussions about Harsanyi's new theory of games with incomplete
information. This was the beginning of my long cooperation with
John C. Harsanyi. Not long after the
conference I became a member of a group of game theorists hired
by the research firm MATHEMATICA to work on projects for the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. The group often met for several
days near Washington D.C.. I cooperated with John C. Harsanyi on
bargaining under incomplete information, but I also did other
work on models of nuclear deterrence. The group did not produce
anything of practical value for the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, but nevertheless it was very successful because important
theoretical advances, e.g. in the analysis of repeated games of
incomplete information by Aumann, Maschler, and Stearns were made
there.
In Germany the Ph. D. is not yet the last formal requirement for
a career as a university teacher. In addition to this, one is
expected to work towards a "habilitation". For this purpose one
presents a habilitation thesis, often a monography of an area of
research. The habilitation is a permission to lecture
independently. In my case the habilitation thesis was a
monography on multiproduct pricing. In the academic year of
1967/68 I was visiting full professor at the business school of
the University
of California, Berkeley. I had completed my habilitation
thesis shortly before I left to Berkeley and was habilitated when
I came back. In 1970 my habilitation thesis was published as a
book.
In 1969, I accepted an offer of the Free University of
Berlin, where I was a full professor of economics until 1972.
My wife and I liked to live in West Berlin. In these years
Germany experienced a period of student unrest, which made
teaching difficult and sometimes impossible. The student movement
was especially strong at the Free University, but this was not
the reason why I moved to the University of Bielefeld in 1972. I was attracted by
plans to create a big Institute of Mathematical Economics.
However, these plans could not be realized since it finally
turned out that the money was not available. Eventually a small
institute with only three professors was established. I was not
unhappy with this solution since I succeeded to convince the
appointment committee that all positions should be held by game
theorists. The positions were filled by Joachim Rosenmuller, Wulf
Albers, and myself. The concentration on game theory gave us a
chance to get some international reputation.
My years at the University of Bielefeld were a productive time.
My experimental research continued but I mainly worked on game
theory and its application to industrial organization and other
areas. After John Harsanyi and I had completed our work on
bargaining under incomplete information we decided to attack the
problem of selecting a unique equilibrium for every game. He
twice came to Bielefeld for a year and I often visited Berkeley
for short periods of one or two months. It took us about 18 years
to construct a reasonable general theory of equilibrium selection
in games. In this time we considered many ideas and rejected two
fairly well worked out approaches. Our book of 1988 only
describes the theory we finally agreed upon.
On my frequent visits to Berkeley I also had a cooperation with
Tom Marschak which resulted in a book on multiproduct pricing
published in 1974. I also did experimental work on bargaining
under incomplete information together with Austin Hoggatt and his
younger associates. In the basement of Barrows Hall at the
University of California, Berkeley, Austin Hoggatt had built up
the first computerized laboratory for experimental economics.
There our experiments were run.
In the twelve years I spent at Bielefeld, I began a close
cooperation with Werner Guth, who in some sense is one of my
students, even if we never held positions at the same university.
We worked on applications of the equilibrium selection theory by
John Harsanyi and myself, long before it had reached a final
form, but we also did research on other problems like wage
bargaining in the framework of a business cycle model. Also other
people who later became university professors sometimes came to
Bielefeld to seek my advise, namely Ulrike Leopold from Graz,
Joel Moulen from Lyon, and Eric van Damme from Eindhoven. Ulrike
Leopold also worked on the application of equilibrium selection
theory and I wrote some papers together with her. Joel Moulen did
Ph.D. work on cooperative game theory and became a professor of
mathematics at Jaounde, Kameroun. Eric van Damme needed very
little advise and is now a well known game theorist.
One of my students, Jon-ren-Chen, a Taiwanese who was my
assistent for many years, has never worked on game theory. He
does applied econometric research on international trade and
development. He was habilitated at Bielefeld and is now a
Professor of Economics at Innsbruck. A student of mine, Rolf
Stoecker, who was a promising young experimentalist left me after
his Ph.D., joined an insurance company and became its chief
executive after 5 years. Later something similar happened to me
again in Bonn. My assistent Gerald Uhlich who had done important
experimental work on coalition bargaining left the university
after his Ph.D. and became the second man in a furniture textile
factory. Nevertheless I still nourish the hope that some of the
students who now work on experimental economics under my guidance
will become university teachers.
At the University of Bielefeld, cross fertilization between
different fields is favored by the existence of a unique
institution, the center for interdisciplinary research. Talks
given there brought me into contact with biologists who made me
aware of applications of game theory to biology. A young
mathematician, Peter Hammerstein, who had a junior position as a
statistical advisor in the biology department made me accquainted
with the notion of evolutionary stability. From that time on I
developed a strong interest in biological game theory. One of my
contributions to this field is the investigation of evolutionary
stability in extensive games. However, I also wrote other papers
in this area, some with Peter Hammerstein and others with Avi
Shmida, a botanist at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, with whom I
cooperate on theoretical models of pollination of flowers by
bees. Peter Hammerstein is now a well established theoretical
biologist. Another student of mine, Franz Weissing, also started
a career as a university teacher of biology.
I find it very interesting to cooperate with scientists in
different fields who have little mathematical training but much
substantial knowledge. My first experience of this kind was my
cooperation with the political scientist Amos Perlmutter with
whom I developed the scenario bundle method, a systematic way of
constructing simple game models of concrete international
conflicts. Unfortunately the results of our research have never
been formally published. It is the advantage of this kind of
interaction that the judgement of the expert on the empirical
facts is not yet contaminated by mathematical models. I had a
similar experience with Avi Shmida, even if he as a natural
scientist is not quite as unmathematical.
I am grateful to Avi Shmida, not only for his scientific
cooperation but also for another reason. Before I came into
contact with theoretical problems in botany I hardly could
distinguish any flower from any other one. However, I felt that I
could not really do work on pollination problems without learning
at least a little of the art of recognizing wild flowers. Since
then I always carry a flower book on my hikes, except in the
winter. I enjoy my often frustrated efforts to identify wild
flowers. This activity has opened my eyes to the astonishing
diversity and the marvelous beauty of flowering plants.
In 1984, I moved to the University of Bonn, where I am a Professor of
Economics since then. I liked the interdisciplinary atmosphere at
the University of Bielefeld, but I wanted to build up a
computerized laboratory for experimental economics and Bonn was
willing to offer me much better conditions in this respect. I
came back to Bielefeld for the time from October 1, 1987, to
September 30, 1988, in order to act as the organizer of a
research year on "game theory in the behavioral sciences" at the
center for interdisciplinary research. The cooperation of an
international group of participants with backgrounds in
economics, biology, mathematics, political science, psychology,
and philosophy finally resulted in four volumes on "game
equilibrium models" published in 1991.
At the University of Bonn my work and that of most of my
assistants is concentrated on experimental economics. It is our
goal to help to build up a descriptive branch of decision and
game theory which takes the limited rationality of human behavior
seriously. The financial support of the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft in the framework of the
Sonderforschungsbereich (special research unit) 303 enables us to
work in this direction.
In 1991, it was discovered that both, I and my wife, suffer from
diabetes. Probably we had this disease for some time without
knowing it. As as consequence of diabetes my wife lost both legs
up to the knee. Therefore she is now bound to the wheelchair.
Moreover her eyesight has become very bad. Nevertheless she does
many things in the house, even if everything takes much longer
than it used to. She cooks and takes care of our three cats and,
what is most important, she maintains a cheerful attitude towards
life. We have learnt to adjust to our situation.
From Les Prix Nobel. The Nobel Prizes 1994, Editor Tore Frängsmyr, [Nobel Foundation], Stockholm, 1995
This autobiography/biography was written at the time of the award and later published in the book series Les Prix Nobel/Nobel Lectures. The information is sometimes updated with an addendum submitted by the Laureate.
Copyright © The Nobel Foundation 1994
MLA style: "Reinhard Selten - Autobiography". Nobelprize.org. 18 May 2013 http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1994/selten.html
