The Nobel Peace Prize 1945
Cordell Hull
Presentation Speech by Gunnar Jahn*, Chairman of the Nobel Committee, December 10, 1945
Cordell Hull has devoted his entire life to
the stabilization of international relations. Best known to the
public are his untiring efforts in the field of commercial
policy, efforts inspired by his desire to counteract autarchic
tendencies both in the U.S.A. and abroad. Of these efforts, which
considerably influenced national policies during the period
between the wars and especially at the end of the twenties, he
says: «There can be no real progress toward confidence or
peace nor permanent trade recovery while retaliations and bitter
trade controversies rage.»1
Confidence and peace between nations have constituted his goal in
all spheres of his activity. This is the driving spirit behind
his fight against isolationism at home, his efforts to create a
peace bloc of states on the American continents, and his work for
the United Nations
Organization.
Cordell Hull was born in 1871 in the state of Tennessee in the
United States of America. He passed his law exams as a relatively
young man, practiced for some years as an attorney, and later
became a judge. But at a very early stage in his career he
embarked on a political career in the ranks of the Democratic
Party. It is as a politician that he is known and it is to
politics that he has devoted all his endeavors from about the age
of twenty. Not until 1907, however, did he enter the House of
Representatives. Prior to that time it is not easy to discern any
clues to his later political attitude in the international field,
but his work reveals evidence of the conscientious and meticulous
manner in which he attacked problems. A key to his general
outlook is provided by some passages in his maiden speech in the
House. In this speech he championed compulsory arbitration
between workers and employers, supported efficient regulation by
the federal government of railway and shipping rates, and opposed
the abuse of power by large corporations in certain fields. The
same basic outlook can also be detected in his speeches on tax
reforms. At that time, the revenues of the federal government
were derived from indirect taxation, mostly from tariffs, the
United States Supreme Court having declared in 1895 that the
introduction of an income tax in 1894 was a breach of the federal
constitution
Refusing to accept this judgment, Hull reopened the question of
taxation and, after the victory of the Democrats in 1912, managed
to secure the introduction of income tax. What interests us,
however, is not so much the tax reform itself, as Hull's argument
in its favor. He certainly saw it as a means of increasing
federal income, but his first concern was with the effects of
this tax as against those of the tariffs. He was convinced that
protectionism created monopoly and enriched the few at the
expense of the many, and that such a system could not be
reconciled with the free competition in which he believed.
We see him here as representative of all that is best in
liberalism, a liberalism with a strong social implication. At
that time, however, he had not yet given utterance to his
international views.
They found expression initially during the First World War. As
Hinton, his biographer, says: «Up to this time Hull's tariff
theories had been based on his belief that protection was a
domestic evil.»2 By the end
of the war his view on economic policy could be expressed as
follows: High tariffs are barriers obstructing the development of
trade and friendship between nations, thereby becoming barriers
also to lasting international peace.
In his great speech to Congress on September 10, 1918, he
expressed his view in these words: «Believing as I have that
the best antidote against war is the removal of its causes rather
than its prevention after the causes once arise, and finding that
trade retaliation and discrimination in its more vicious forms
have been productive of bitter economic wars which in many cases
have developed into wars of force, I introduced the resolution in
the House of Representatives during the early part of last year
which would provide for the organization of an international
trade-agreement congress the objects of which should be to
eliminate by mutual agreement all possible methods of retaliation
and discrimination in international trade.»3
As early as 1917, he put forward the idea of an international
agreement to govern the methods employed in commercial
competition. The task of reducing trade restrictions was taken up
in the League of Nations and a basis for the work of the
following years established at the great world conference in 1927
at Geneva4. The culmination of
these efforts was the World Economic Conference in London in 1933
which Hull himself attended, this time as secretary of state. All
of us who took part in this work during those years know how
every proposal we made encountered resistance time and again from
various countries whose attitudes were governed exclusively by
the political situation at home. The 1933 conference, as we know,
failed to achieve anything. It may be that it was a mistake to
lay so much stress on the question of stabilization of currency
from the very beginning; it was this which led to Roosevelt's
famous telegram in which he rejected the plan for currency
stabilization on the grounds that, as he put it, a nation's
prosperity depends more upon a healthy internal economic
structure than it does upon the price of its currency in relation
to the price of currencies of other nations. This attitude, which
prevailed in the United States and was expressed by Roosevelt in
his telegram, brought Hull's work in this direction to a halt. As
has so often been the case in international politics, people
could see the difficulties in their own country and had faith in
their ability to solve them in isolation from the world. Hull
himself in no way subscribed to this view. In a speech given on
July 27, 1933, in London, he said: «At this moment the world
is still engaged in wild competition, in economic armaments which
constantly menace both peace and commerce.» And a little
later in the speech he added: «Indispensable and
all-important as domestic programs are, they cannot by themselves
restore business to the highest levels of permanent
recovery.»5
Yet Hull did not give up, even though the London conference was a
setback for his ideas. In 1934 he secured the passage of a
bill6 empowering the president to
lower tariffs by fifty percent and to reduce import restrictions
for countries prepared to grant similar concessions to the United
States. He was eventually able to conclude no fewer than
twenty-seven trade agreements on the basis of this bill.
This law, which was subject to a time limitation, was last
renewed in 1945 and authorized the president to reduce tariffs by
forty-five percent. This was, of course, after Hull had retired,
but it represented nevertheless a victory for his policy.
All of this marks a radical change in the economic policy of the
United States; it is an affirmation of England's policy during
the free trade period, taking as a model the Cobden Treaty of
1860 of which the «most-favored nation» clause formed
an integral part7. Although the
change is partly due to the acceptance of the United States as a
creditor nation, it signifies something more profound for Hull:
it is his immutable belief that it will clear the way for
improved international relations and remove one of the causes of
war. It is so typical of the man: if he does not succeed with a
frontal assault, then he immediately reconnoiters the flanks. He
yields to defeat, but he never accepts it as final, for his
belief in the cause is too firmly rooted. And he is realist
enough to recognize what is politically feasible at any given
time, choosing to accept that rather than await something which
may, perhaps, come one day.
I have dwelt at some length on Hull's work in formulating
economic policies since it reveals characteristic traits in his
philosophy and method, but in so doing I have anticipated the
events of his life.
I had come to his work in the House of Representatives. He became
a member of the Senate in 1929, but it was with the election of
Roosevelt in 1932 that, as secretary of state8, he first had the opportunity to devote
himself entirely to his ideas. Now it is always very difficult to
say to what extent ideas and policies derive from the secretary
of state and in what measure from the president. And this is even
more difficult with a man like Hull, because, as Sumner Welles
says: «Cordell Hull is the least selfseeking man I have ever
known. One of the striking sidelights on the years of his
distinguished statesmanship has been his willingness to stay in
the background and to let others take the credit and glory. I
know of several outstanding instances where Mr. Hull carefully
diverted attention away from his own authorship or able
sponsorship of a good plan so that some temperamental foreign
government official might acquire merit in the eyes of his
constituents at home as father of the proposal. Mr. Hull was
content that the good idea should take root and
flourish.»9
This is high praise indeed for any man, but still more laudatory
when said of a politician, since it is seldom that politicians
are eulogized in such terms.
It is impossible, in this brief synopsis, to review Hull's work
in the years following 1932, for this would entail an examination
of the United States' foreign policy during that period.
No foreign minister can have held office in more difficult times.
As I have already mentioned, the year in which he took up his
appointment heralded the defeat of economic cooperation and the
accession of Hitler to power in Germany. Each year brought events
that could have driven anyone to despair and that inexorably led
toward another world war. Yet Hull never gave up, despite
opposition both at home and abroad. If he found one path to the
implementation of his ideas blocked, he would try another. If he
could not achieve his ideal immediately, he would make the best
of the situation and return to the attack when the time was
ripe.
Nothing illustrates his approach better than his Pan-American
policy and his attitude to the laws of neutrality. The
Pan-American policy sponsored by Roosevelt and Hull was launched
at the Montevideo Conference of 1933 at which all the American
republics were represented. Roosevelt's «good neighbor
policy» was at once the starting point and the goal of a
policy which, recognizing the impossibility of embracing the
whole world, aimed first and foremost at creating peace and good
neighborliness among the nations of the American continents. As
Hull said in a private conversation, «We ought to be able to
work out a pattern of life which will inspire the whole world to
follow our example when the present tumult dies
down.»10
At this conference a convention was successfully drafted defining
the rights and obligations of each nation. Its most important
clause, perhaps, was that which stated that no nation has the
right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of any
other. This conference was followed by the one in Buenos Aires in
1936 and by the Lima Conference of 1938. One of the achievements
of the Buenos Aires Conference was the approval of an agreement
for collective security and neutrality in the event of war. When
the Lima Conference took place, the outlook in Europe had become
more ominous, and a firmer and more somber tone could be
discerned in Hull's speeches which focused on the threat
emanating from the totalitarian states. At Lima, Hull did not
attain the goal which he sought. The conference certainly
represented a victory for the ideals of peace, but little
progress was made beyond the point reached in the conferences at
Montevideo and Buenos Aires. The chief stumbling block was the
stand taken by Argentina who, for several reasons, was unable to
commit herself to the same extent as the United States. But to
this must be added a circumstance which affected all the
Pan-American conferences; namely, the relation of the countries
involved to the League of Nations. The South American countries
were members, the United States was not; and this fact gave rise
to difficulties which prevented the conferences from achieving
the desired results. In Europe, these Pan-American conferences
have often been looked upon as a form of expanded isolationism,
but they should not be so regarded. They are large-scale attempts
to realize the ideas of peace by international cooperation
wherever this appears to be practical, and to create, as Cordell
Hull says, an example which will inspire the whole world.
The struggle on the law of neutrality and the fight against
isolationism are so recent as to be fresh in our memories. The
original law of neutrality can in one sense be said to serve the
idea of peace, and it cannot be denied that isolationism was
pacifist in outlook. But while the isolationists regarded peace
primarily as peace for the United States, Hull envisaged a more
flexible form of neutrality which would permit the United States
to cooperate with other countries in maintaining peace, because,
as he put it, the United States cannot unilaterally proclaim
peace for herself alone. In this as in other declarations he
returns again and again to the theme that peace is not to be
thought of as a privilege for any particular nation. For him
peace means peace among all nations. But he is realist enough to
know that it is necessary to struggle to achieve it.
As already mentioned, Hull did not mince his words when
discussing relations with the totalitarian states in Europe and,
as the war drew nearer, he made his speeches sharper and more
intense. Everything within him - his sense of justice, his deep
humanism - revolted against what he considered an encroachment
upon and a violation of everything that stood for decency. But on
the outbreak of war his voice was dominated by that of Roosevelt,
who now spoke more strongly than before as the leader of United
States' foreign policy. This had to be, and it is hard for anyone
not intimately involved to assess the credit due to Cordell
Hull's work during these years. One can only draw some
conclusions from the little that is known: He has devoted every
effort to strengthening the forces marshaled against the
aggressive powers, but at the same time has worked intensely on
the problems which will arise with the coming of peace. The
direction these efforts were taking could be discerned in the
draft of the six clauses governing the future policy of the four
great powers11, adopted at the
Moscow Conference of 1943. Moreover, as we now know, he devoted
strenuous efforts during the last stage of the war to the
resolution of problems associated with the setting up of the new
organization «The United Nations». That is his latest
contribution. He says himself in the letter of
resignation12 which he wrote to
Roosevelt on November 21, 1944, after deciding to retire because
of ill health: «It is a supreme tragedy to me personally
that I am unable to continue making my full contribution to such
great international undertakings as the creation of the postwar
peace organization, the solution of the many other problems
involved in the promotion of international cooperation, and the
final development of a full and complete structure of a world
order under law.»
To this letter Roosevelt replied13: «Incidentally, when the organization
of the United Nations is set up, I shall continue to pray that
you as the Father of the United Nations may preside over its
first session. That has nothing to do with whether you are
Secretary of State or not at that time, but should go to you as
the one person in all the world who has done the most to make
this great plan for peace an effective fact. In so many different
ways you have contributed to friendly relations among nations
that even though you may not remain in a position of executive
administration, you will continue to help the world with your
moral guidance.»
«Father of the United Nations» Roosevelt called him.
Hull will assuredly not claim that the organization was his work.
For him it was of very little importance whether the credit went
to him or to someone else, provided the ideas triumphed. For,
despite his great idealism, he has always lived in the world of
reality, never doubting that it could be molded to fit the
principles of justice. Principles of justice, which in the United
States, perhaps more than anywhere else, become the heritage of
every individual from his schooldays on, have been the guiding
star of his work, the locus where life and creed become
one.
It is therefore with the greatest satisfaction that the Nobel
Committee of the Norwegian Parliament presents the Peace Prize
for 1945 to this great American for his long and indefatigable
work for understanding between nations.
* Mr. Jahn
delivered this speech in the auditorium of the Nobel Institute in
Oslo on the afternoon of December 10, 1945. Since Mr. Hull, the
laureate, was unable to be present, Mr. Lithgow Osborne,
ambassador of the United States to Norway, accepted the prize in his name. This
translation is based on the Norwegian text in Les Prix Nobel
en 1945.
1. Statement made by Hull in 1931.
Harold B. Hinton, Cordell Hull: A Biography, p. 144.
2. Ibid., p. 105.
3. Ibid., p. 112.
4. The International Economic
Conference (May 4-May 23, 1927).
5. From Hull's speech on the
closing day of the World Monetary and Economic Conference,
Hinton, op. cit., p. 159.
6. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements
Act (June 12, 1934).
7. The Cobden-Chevalier Treaty
(January 23, 1860) provided for reciprocal tariffs between
Britain and France.
8. Hull entered the Senate in
1931; he became secretary of state on March 4, 1933, the day
Franklin D. Roosevelt was inaugurated as president.
9. Hinton, op.cit., p.v;
from Foreword by Sumner Welles (1892-1961), U.S. Undersecretary
of state (1937-1943).
10. Ibid., pp.
11-12.
11. Drafted by the U.S., the
U.S.S.R., and England, but signed also by China.
12. Hull, Memoirs, p.
1717.
13. Ibid., p. 1718.
From Nobel Lectures, Peace 1926-1950, Editor Frederick W. Haberman, Elsevier Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1972
Copyright © The Nobel Foundation 1945
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